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In most countries, the central bank performs an important role in the management of the financial system.  However, since the main task of the central bank is to preserve the value of the currency, the assignment of other “optional tasks”, such as bank supervision, has been at the center of a policy debate.  For instance, policymakers in Japan recently removed their central bank from its role in bank supervision.  The Bank of England lost its supervisory duties in 1997, while at the moment, the European Central Bank has no such role.  In the U.S., where the Federal Reserve (FED) has only partial responsibility for the supervision of banks, in 1994 there was a proposal to the Congress to consolidate all supervisory duties under a new single federal regulator, separate from the FED.
	In spite of its importance, this topic has not yet received sufficient treatment in the economics literature.  Only a few recent papers have investigated the positive and negative aspects of a combined regime.​[1]​  These studies are mainly empirical, trying to establish whether the central bank's supervisory duties affect monetary policy and vice versa.  Most of the early studies provide only indirect evidence of such cross-effects.  For example, Heller (1991), and Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1992) compare the inflation rates achieved by central banks with and without bank supervisory duties.  They find that countries with central banks that have supervisory responsibilities experience higher inflation rates, and interpret this as evidence supporting the “conflict of interest” hypothesis.  However, higher inflation rates under a combined regime are not necessarily the result of the central bank being distracted by supervisory considerations.  In addition, cross-country comparisons using simple descriptive statistics are naturally impaired by differences across countries in the structure of their financial systems as well as differences in the timing and magnitude of their business cycles.  The same concerns apply for cross-country comparisons of bank failure rates under the two alternative regimes (Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992 and 1995).
A recent study by Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999) takes a different approach.  Using confidential bank rating data for the U.S., the authors find that information obtained from bank supervision helps the central bank to conduct monetary policy more effectively.  This finding is important for several reasons.  First, it provides an important reason for why monetary and supervisory functions should not be separated.  Second, it is currently the only empirical work that documents in a direct way that bank supervision affects monetary policy.  Moreover, since their analysis is limited to the U.S. economy, it is not subject to the same problems of previous cross-country studies.
Even if supervisory information improves the performance of monetary policy, it is not clear that the central bank should retain its supervisory duties if these duties harm its role as a bank supervisor.  For example, Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1992) argue that the cyclical effects of regulatory and monetary policy are usually in conflict.  Monetary policy is known to be countercyclical, while the effects of supervision are usually procyclical offsetting, to some extent, the objectives of monetary policy.​[2]​  Thus, the pressures arising from this conflict may cause regulators to relax their supervision when monetary policy is expansionary.  Hence, whether the central bank should retain its bank supervisory duties or not, it also depends on the effect of monetary policy on bank supervision.
This paper examines whether and how monetary policy duties affect the central bank's role in bank supervision.  To address this question, this study exploits the segmented structure of the U.S. bank regulatory and supervisory system.  Specifically, all insured commercial and savings banks in the U.S. have one of the following agencies as their primary federal regulator: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), or the Federal Reserve System (FED).  While the FED's primary responsibility is to conduct monetary policy, the other two agencies have no such duty.  Hence, using the FDIC and the OCC as a control group, the supervisory behavior of the FED is compared with the behavior of the other two agencies.  The analysis focuses on a particular aspect of bank supervision: the imposition of formal regulatory actions (i.e., cease and desist orders and written agreements) against banks in financial distress.  This is an important aspect of bank supervision for which comprehensive data can be constructed using publicly available information.
In order to perform this comparison, a unique and rich dataset is created.  Information collected from the formal action documents is combined with bank-level indicators of financial performance (constructed using the Call Report Data) and indicators of the aggregate and regional economy.  The resulting unbalanced panel includes the “universe”: all U.S. insured commercial and savings banks and all formal actions issued against these types of institutions during the period 1990:I-1998:IV.  Data availability dictates the sample's starting point.  In particular, formal actions (a crucial ingredient for the analysis) have been disclosed only since late 1989.
	The estimation results suggest that the FED's monetary policy responsibilities do alter its bank supervisory behavior.  In particular, indicators of monetary policy affect the supervisory actions of the FED but do not affect the actions of the FDIC and the OCC.  In particular, when the federal funds rate increases, the FED becomes less strict in bank supervision.  One possible explanation is that the FED tries to mitigate the “tax-effect” of higher interest rates on banks by going easier on regulatory intervention.





The major argument for combining the monetary and supervisory functions is linked to the central bank's concern for the “systemic stability” of the financial system (Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992 and 1995).  Discussions focus on when it is considered appropriate for the central bank to provide lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities, and whether a LOLR role should be accompanied by supervisory duties to reduce moral hazard.
	On the grounds of moral hazard, it is appropriate to provide LOLR facilities when a bank is illiquid but not insolvent (e.g., Bagehot, 1873; Humphrey, 1975).  Hence, if the central bank supervises an institution, it may know more precisely whether an institution asking for credit from the LOLR is insolvent or just illiquid.  Moreover, the micro-information obtained from supervision is particularly useful during financial crises, when only direct supervision can deliver the essential information on time.​[3]​  Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1992 and 1995), using a cross-country dataset of bank failures, found that countries where central banks are involved in supervision have on average fewer bank failures.
	As they pointed out, this finding entails no welfare implications: it is not clear whether the cost of a bank failure compensates for the efficiency loss in resource allocation and other costs linked to the bail out.  Goodhart and Shoenmaker went on to examine the method adopted to deal with failing banks and the resulting choice of funding.  For the former they found no significant difference between the two regimes, while for the latter they found some differences.  In particular, less government and more commercial bank funds are used when the central bank is involved in bank supervision.  However, cross-country comparisons using simple descriptive statistics are inevitably flawed due to differences in legal and accounting procedures, as well as differences in the timing and magnitude of the business cycle.​[4]​  Moreover, as Goodhart and Shoenmaker pointed out their study does not provide a complete coverage of bank failures.​[5]​ 
	Another fundamental argument supporting a unified agency regime is the protection of the payments system.  In net settlement systems, participants send payment instructions over a period of time, with the settlements occurring only at the end of this period.  As financial institutions extend credit to each other, they expose themselves to significant credit risk.  If one or more of them fail to settle their debit positions, the non-defaulting members have to cover the shortfall based on some kind of loss-sharing agreement (possibly backed by collateral posted at the clearing house).  This may weaken significantly the non-defaulting members.​[6]​  In that case, the central bank as a LOLR may feel compelled to support the failing participants to avoid systemic “knock-on” effects (Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992).  Hence, the central bank assumes part of the liquidity risk of the settlement and becomes effectively an “implicit guarantor” of the system.
	Despite the growing chorus of academics deploring such rescues on grounds of moral hazard​[7]​ there is no evidence that authorities are becoming more willing to accept bank failures (e.g., recent events in Japan).  Therefore, to the extent that the central bank continues to operate the payments system and act as a LOLR, it is likely that it will want to maintain some regulatory and supervisory functions in order to limit such risks.
	A recent paper by Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999) takes a different approach. They argue that information obtained from bank supervision could improve the accuracy of economic forecasting, and thus help the central bank to conduct monetary policy more effectively. For example, problems in the banking sector may serve as an early indicator of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. In addition, supervisory information could provide advance notice of changes in bank lending behavior.​[8]​  Using confidential micro-data for the U.S., they found that supervisory information (based on CAMEL ratings) can and does help the FED to conduct monetary policy.
	While this evidence shows that the monetary authority should have access to supervisory information, it does not establish that the FED should be the supervisor.  The FED could simply request CAMEL ratings from the agency doing the supervision.  However, Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999) argue that effective use of this information may be very difficult in practice.  In particular, the assessment of a bank's health and the information used may depend on the objective function of the agency doing the supervision.  Differences in objectives could lead to the collection and emphasis of different information.  It may also affect the way CAMEL ratings are assigned.  For example, during the Third-World debt crisis, some banks that were perceived as “too big to fail” may have received better CAMEL ratings than their true condition warranted.  Thus, in order to effectively use the bank supervisory information, the FED should not only know the aggregate ratings, but whether and for which institutions forbearance is occurring.  The latter implies a direct supervisory role for the central bank.
The most common argument for separating monetary policy responsibilities from the bank supervisory responsibilities is that the combination of functions may lead to a “conflict of interest”.  Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1992 and 1995) argue that a conflict of interest may emerge between the monetary authority, that desires higher interest rates (e.g., to fight inflation or to maintain an exchange rate peg), and the supervisory authority, that is concerned about the adverse effects of higher interest rates on the solvency and profitability of the banking sector.  In addition, the combination of functions may lead to expectations on the part of the private sector (when setting prices) that the central bank's monetary policy may be affected by financial stability considerations.
	Unfortunately, with discussions usually internalized within the central bank, it is very difficult to document whether or the extent to which interest rates were indeed kept lower than they would have been otherwise.  However, there were a number of cases where it was argued that interest rates were held down because of concerns about the financial sector.  According to Vittas (1992), during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, U.S. interest rates were kept low because of the severe problems of the Savings and Loan Associations.​[9]​ 
	To test the conflict of interest hypothesis, Heller (1991) and Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1992) compared the track record of central banks with and without supervisory duties in achieving the central goal of monetary policy (i.e., low inflation rates).  In particular, they compared the average inflation rate in countries with a combined regime with the inflation rates of countries with separated regime.  They found that central banks without supervisory responsibilities have on average lower inflation rates.  However, as Heller (1991) pointed out “it may well be that independent central banks are better in attaining the goal of price stability and that these independent banks do not tend to have supervisory responsibilities”.  Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) examined this possibility.  Using a dataset of 24 OCED countries, they found that even after controlling for central bank independence,​[10]​ central banks without supervisory duties achieve lower inflation rates.  However, while they used a wide range of developed and developing countries, they did not control for any other cross-country differences other than central bank independence.





Does the central bank's responsibility for monetary policy alter its behavior as a bank supervisor?  This question can be addressed by taking advantage of the segmented structure of the U.S. bank regulatory and supervisory system.  Specifically, all insured commercial and savings banks in the U.S. are primarily supervised by one of the following federal agencies: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), or the Federal Reserve System (FED).  In particular, national banks are supervised by the OCC, while state banks are supervised either by the FDIC or by the FED.​[12]​  However, among the three agencies, the FED is the only one responsible for monetary policy.  Hence, if monetary policy duties alter the FED's role as a bank supervisor, the FED's supervisory actions would be affected by monetary policy considerations, while the actions of the other two agencies would not be.




where  is assumed to be the standard normal distribution.   is equal to one if the supervisor imposed a FA on bank  at time , and is equal to zero otherwise.  The matrix  includes indicators of the condition of bank  at time  and , indicators of the prospects of the economic environment in which the bank operates, and bank size indicators.  In addition, supervisory agency dummy variables are used to account for the possibility of systematic differences across agencies, either in supervisory standards or in the quality of banks supervised.
	Following Peek and Rosengren (1995b), time  refers to the exam date that resulted in the imposition of a FA and not to the date that the action became effective (i.e., the sign date).  If time  was referring to the sign date, the analysis would capture a different condition (most probably improved) from the one that triggered intervention by the bank's supervisor.  In particular, supervisors decide to issue a FA based on the information they obtain during an examination.  However, FAs become effective at least 60 to 90 days after the exam date and many over a year later.  During this interim period, the institution knows that a FA is going to be issued against it.  Hence, it is expected to start improving its condition even before the action is signed.









The dataset covers the period 1990:I-1998:IV.  Data availability regarding the dependent variable  determines the sample's starting point.  Specifically, the date of the examination that resulted in the imposition of a FA is necessary for generating .  These exam dates are reported in the FA documents, which have been disclosed only since the late 1989.  In particular, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 made public all cease and desist orders (C&Ds) signed after August 9, 1989.  The Crime Control Act of 1990 requires disclosure of all written agreements (WAs) signed after November 29, 1990.  FAs issued because of violations of laws and regulations (and not because of deteriorating financial conditions) are eliminated.




Bank-level indicators of performance for all insured commercial and savings banks in the U.S. are constructed using the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (known as the Call Reports), available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.  In order to create consistent time-series variables, this dataset involves a number of challenges (e.g., dealing with mergers, de novos, “shell” banks, and changes of definitions over time).  A data appendix, which is available in Ioannidou (2002), describes in detail the methods used to deal with these problems.  The indicators used to capture the health of an institution cover the areas in which examiners base their evaluations.  See Table 2 for definitions and notation.




A crucial ingredient for estimating equation (1) is a good indicator of the stance of monetary policy.  Unfortunately, there is no general consensus in the literature as to which variable is the best indicator.  In fact, different variables have been proposed, such as the federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, and monetary aggregates.​[14]​  Since the FED's operating procedures have varied over time, any single indicator of monetary policy is likely to be problematic in some periods.  As Bernanke and Mihov (1995a, p. 37-38) point out, “the federal funds rate, which was the best indicator of monetary policy prior to 1979, has become again during the tenure of Chairman Greenspan.  However, the funds rate was not necessarily a good indicator of policy during the early to mid-1980's...” 
	Since the empirical exercise in this paper is limited to the 1990s, the federal funds rate is used.  Indicators of the economic environment are used to control for the effect of the business cycle on the probability of receiving a FA.  Specifically, real Gross Domestic Product, and national and state unemployment rates are taken respectively from the National Income and Product Accounts and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The difference between national and state unemployment rates is used in order to capture the relative condition of the local economy.  Finally, a set of regional dummy variables, based on census regions, is employed to account for systematic differences across regions.


V.  Estimation Results

This section provides a brief summary of the paper’s main results, which area available in a more comprehensive version of this paper, Ioannidou (2002).
Table 4 in Ioannidou (2002) provides estimation results for three different specifications of equation (1).  The first column reports a benchmark regression, similar with those seen in the literature (see, for example, Peek and Rosengren, 1995b).  It includes bank-level indicators of financial performance, an indicator of bank size, dummy variables for the bank's primary federal supervisor, as well as regional and quarterly time dummies.  All estimated coefficients on indicators of bank health and size are statistically significant and have the expected sign.  In column (2) the federal funds rate is added in order to examine whether the stance of monetary policy affects the probability of supervisory intervention in troubled banks.  The estimated coefficient on the federal funds rate is negative and insignificant.  It seems that after controlling for the health of an institution, the business cycle, the bank size, and the supervisor of a bank, the probability of a FA does not depend on the stance of monetary policy.
	However, when in column (3) the federal funds rate is interacted with supervisory dummy variables to allow for differential effects across supervisors an interesting result emerges.  Monetary policy affects the supervisory actions of the FED, but does not affect the actions of the other two agencies.  In particular, the estimated coefficient on the federal funds rate for the FED is negative (.-570) and highly significant.  In contrast, the estimated coefficients for the OCC and the FDIC are highly insignificant and approximately equal to zero (.0045 for the OCC and .0046 for the FDIC).​[15]​  This result suggests that the central bank's monetary policy responsibilities do alter its role in bank supervision, at least for the U.S. during the sample period.  Since the federal funds rate matters only for the FED, it is unlikely that it simply captures the effect of the business cycle.  If it were picking up the business cycle, it would have been significant for all three supervisors (maybe with different coefficients) and not just for the FED.
	To investigate this possibility further, other indicators of the business cycle are interacted with the supervisory dummy variables.  In column (1) of Table 6 in Ioannidou (2002), the growth rate of real GDP is interacted with the FDIC, the OCC, and the FED dummy variables.  The results suggest that the growth rate of real GDP matters for all three supervisors and not just for the FED.  The same is true for the annual change of the national rate of unemployment in column (2).  In addition, hypothesis tests reject any differential effect across supervisors with respect to the business cycle (i.e., the estimated coefficients on the interacted terms are not statistically different from each other).  These findings reinforce the evidence provided by Table 4.  Specifically, none of the business cycle indicators exhibit the characteristic of the estimated coefficients on the funds rate.
	All evidence suggests that the central bank's monetary policy responsibilities do alter its role in bank supervision, at least for the U.S. during the sample period.  In particular, the negative sign on the coefficient of the federal funds rate suggests that when the FED increases the funds rate, it becomes less strict in supervisory role.  This could be interpreted as an attempt to compensate banks for the extra pressure it puts on them by increasing the funds rate.  An increase in the funds rate acts as an extra tax on banks, since it increases the opportunity cost of holding non-interest-bearing reserves.  Moreover, given the maturity mismatch between the asset and liability sides of a bank's balance sheet, an increase in the interest rate affects adversely the net revenues from interest bearing assets and liabilities (i.e., it decreases the difference between the interest received from loans and the interest paid to depositors).  Given this additional pressure, the FED might be interested in compensating banks either because it views them as its constituency or because it is concerned about the micro-stability of the financial sector.  After all, the FED is also responsible for maintaining the stability and the smooth functioning of the financial system.  In addition, the negative sign on the coefficient of the federal funds rate indicates the FED is not using its bank supervisory role to reinforce the objectives of monetary policy.  If it were, the funds rate would enter with a positive sign (i.e., supervisors would relax their supervision when monetary policy is expansionary).





This paper examines whether and how monetary policy responsibilities affect the central bank's role as a bank supervisor.  The methodology and the data employed improve upon previous studies in at least two ways.  First, the paper escapes the usual criticisms of cross-sectional studies by limiting the analysis within a single country, the U.S.  Furthermore, the U.S. bank regulatory and supervisory system is ideal because of its segmented structure.  Second, the construction and use of a unique dataset on formal regulatory actions allows a direct test of the behavior of bank supervisors.
The estimation results indicate that the FED's monetary policy responsibilities do alter its bank supervisory role, at least for the U.S. during the sample period and for the particular aspect of bank supervision examined here.  In particular, the stance of monetary policy, as captured by the federal funds rate, affects the supervisory behavior of the FED, but does not affect the behavior of the other two agencies.  Since the indicator of monetary policy matters only for the FED, it is highly unlikely that it simply captures the effect of the business cycle.  However, this possibility is formally tested by examining whether any of the “traditional” indicators of the business cycle affect bank supervision in the same way as the funds rate does.  It turns out that indicators of the business cycle, such as the growth rate of real GDP and the change in the national unemployment rate, matter for all three supervisors and not just for the FED.  Hence, the possibility that the funds rate is capturing some type of differential response of supervisors towards the business cycle is strongly rejected by the data.
	The negative sign on the estimated coefficient on the federal funds rate suggests that when the FED increases the federal funds rate, it becomes less strict with respect to its bank supervisory role.  One explanation is that the FED compensates banks for the extra pressure it puts on them when it increases the funds rate, either because it views them as its constituency or because it is concerned about the micro-stability of the financial sector.  After all, the FED is responsible for maintaining the stability and the smooth functioning of the financial system.  The negative sign on the coefficient of the federal funds rate also indicates that the FED is not using its role in bank supervision to reinforce the objectives of monetary policy (i.e., it does not try to get a “big bang for the buck”).
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Formal Actions Imposed During the Period 1990-1998
















Bank Level Indicators of Financial Performance
Capital Adequacy	Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets	Tier1/RWA
	Tier 1 Capital to Average Assets	Tier1/AvA
	Total Capital to Risk Weighted Assets	TC/RWA
Asset Quality	Real Estate Loans to Total Loans	REL/L
	Commercial & Industrial Loans to Total Loans	C&I/L
	Other Real Estate Owned to Total Loans	OREO/L
	Nonperforming Loans to Total Loans	NPL/L
	Loan Loss Reserves to Total Assets	LLR/A
	Loan Loss Reserves to Total Loans	LLR/L
Asset Liquidity	Liquid Assets to Total Assets	LA/A
	Brokered Deposits to Total Assets	BKD/A
Earnings Ratios	Return on Average Assets	R/AvA
	Return on Average Equity	R/AvA
	Loan Loss Provisions to Average Assets	LLP/AvA
	Net Loan Losses to Average Loans	NLL/AvA
Off-Balance Sheet	Non-interest Income to Total Interest Income	NII/TII
Bank Size	Log of Total Assets	LogAssets
		
Supervisor Specific Variables
	Dummy variable for banks supervised by the OCC	OCC
	Dummy variable for banks supervised by the FDIC	FDIC
	Dummy variable for banks supervised by the FED	FED
	Federal Funds Rate	Fed. Fund
		
		
Indicators of the Economic Environment
	Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP	G(RGDP)
	State Unemployment Rate – National Unempl. Rate	Sune-Nune






Average Risk Profile of Three Groups of Banks During 1990-1998
Capital Adequacy	No FA	Start FA	End FA
Tier 1 Capital to Average Assets	9.65	6.45	8.77
	(3.47)	(3.03)	(9.31)
Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets	15.83	10.27	13.86
	(976)	(6.21)	(10.91)




Real Estate Loans to Total Loans	3.25	6.11	3.44
	(5.24)	(8.06)	(4.94)
Commercial & Industrial Loans to Total Loans	16.56	22.27	18.41
	(11.64)	(14.97)	(12.32)
Nonperforming Loans to Total Loans	1.41	4.93	2.66
	(1.89)	(3.97)	(2.75)
Loan Loss Reserves to Total Assets	.89	1.68	1.42
	(.52)	(1.05)	(.86)




Liquid Assets to Total Assets	.29	.21	.28
	(.15)	(.12)	(.13)




Return to Average Assets	1.09	-2.18	.92
	(1.34)	(4.75)	(1.85)
Return to Average Equity	11.72	-37.14	12.27
	(25.99)	(93.87)	(26.52)
Loan Loss Provisions to Average Assets	.29	3.00	.20
	(.90)	(4.54)	(1.26)
Net Loan Losses to Average Assets	.38	3.11	.40
	(1.38)	(4.82)	(1.74)
Total Number of Observations	369855	1013	909
Notes. No FA: banks not under a FA; Start FA: banks at the time of the exam that resulted










^1	   See for example, Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999), Goodhart and Shoenmaker (1992 and 1995), Heller (1991), Haubrich (1996), Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999), and Tuya and Zamalloa (1994).
^2	   For example, the slow recovery from the 1990 U.S. recession was attributed by many researchers to a dramatic decrease in the supply of bank loans caused by increased capital requirements and more stringent regulatory practices (see Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Berger and Udell, 1994; Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995; Hancock, Laing and Wilcox, 1995; and Peek and Rosengren, 1995a).
^3	   The speed and the degree with which the condition of a financial institution deteriorates is significantly higher during periods of financial instability.  Moreover, it is in “bad” times that institutions have the strongest incentives to “cook” their books and hide their true condition
^4	   The study includes a wide range of countries, with significant economic and political differences over their sample period (it includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zeeland, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela).
^5	   This is particularly true for the U.S. Their study includes only 104 bank failures in 24 countries, while the U.S. alone experienced thousands of bank failures during the 1980s.
^6	   They may be able to settle at the end of a given cycle and unable to open for business the next day.
^7	   See, for example, Benston et al. (1986), Kane (1992), and White (1984).
^8	   This argument assumes that the “lending channel” of monetary policy is operative (see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Hubbard, 1995b; and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993).
^9	   There was a maturity mismatch between long-term loans at fixed rates and short-term liabilities.
^10	   Using the index of central bank independence derived by Grilli, Masciantaro, and Tabelini (1991).
^11	   For example, Peek and Rosengren (1995b) found that banks under formal actions decrease new lending by 1.9% per quarter.
^12	   The FED supervises state banks that choose to become members of the FED, while the FDIC is the primary supervisor of state nonmember banks.
^13	   Since FAs are legally enforceable with civil monetary penalties for noncompliance, they are viewed as the most serious actions available to supervisors, short of closing the bank.
^14	   See Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for an excellent literature review on measuring monetary policy.
^15	   This result is robust to other indicators of monetary policy that are known to perform well during the Greenspan period (e.g., the three-month treasury bill rate and the six-month less the three-month treasury bill rate). This is not surprising since short-term interest rates are highly correlated with each other. For this reason and because of space constraints, tables with these results are not shown, but are available upon request.
